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The concept of a minimum level of care is central to the 
facilitation and achievement of a more equitable and efficient 
quality health care system in South Africa. The National Health 
Act1 mandates that ‘the Minister must, within the limits of 
available resources ensure the provision of such essential 
health services, which must at least include primary health 
care services and equitably prioritise the health services that 
the State can provide’. The Department of Health inquiry 
into a system of social security for South Africa concluded 
that government policy needs to provide a framework that 
‘results in cover for a minimum level of essential health 
benefits irrespective of whether it is provided in the public 
or the private sectors’.2 This need for a basic package of care 
is further endorsed by the draft Health Charter.3  Although 
various government initiatives have defined essential services, 
the Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMBs) as provided for by the 
Medical Schemes Act have had the greatest prominence.4  Not 
only are they legislated, but they are the envisaged platform 
for the social health insurance package which is to be pre-
funded by all earning above a given threshold, and which will 
define the entitlement for any person contributing towards 
such insurance.  The aim of this article is to elucidate the core 
package approach in South Africa and to focus more specifically 
on the appropriateness of pursuing the current PMBs as the 
platform for social health reform.
Defining essential care
The concept of minimum or essential care is only important 
because of resource limitations.  Ideally, everybody should have 
access to all the health care they need.  However, because funds 
are limited, care must be prioritised to ensure access to at least 
the most important services.  
The ambit and level of care so prioritised are critically 
dependent on the monetary amounts available – the greater 
the resources, the more generous the interpretation of what is 
indeed regarded as indispensable.  Where there are only limited 
financial constraints, as in various First-World countries, the 
predominant challenges for policymakers in this regard are 
limited to delineating what in fact constitutes a health care 
need (e.g. to what extent should a health care system ensure 
the availability of cosmetic surgery or advanced dentistry) and 
to defining ‘best clinical practice’ based on available evidence.  
However, as financial limitations become starker, the challenge 
of prioritisation grows exponentially, with social objectives of 
health, cost efficiency of different health care interventions, 
local priorities, and moral considerations of distributive justice 
becoming critical determinants of decision making.     
Essential care packages in South Africa
Other than prioritising health care services to ensure fair 
allocation of limited resources, core packages (interchangeably 
referred to as essential health, basic benefit or minimum care 
packages) are also intended to effect particular aspects of 
health care reform or policy.5 Different packages therefore have 
different purposes and implications, and for this reason it is 
important not to use these terms generically, but rather indicate 
which specific package is referred to. To date the following core 
packages have been defined by the South African government.
The Primary Health Care Package (PHCP)6 is expressed in 
terms of norms and standards and is aimed at strengthening 
primary care services in the public sector.  It provides goals 
that all clinics delivering primary care services should achieve.  
Standards tend to reflect infrastructural requirements, including 
staff training and availability of medicines, whereas norms 
tend to identify care targets. Community participation to plan 
services and identify priorities is actively encouraged.  The 
main focus is on the management of prevalent conditions. 
The Essential Drugs List (EDL)7 is not only central to the PHCP, 
but also guides service delivery at secondary and tertiary care 
institutions.  It identifies which drugs should be procured for 
common conditions at the various levels of the health care 
system and describes how these drugs should be used.
The PHCP and EDL are therefore aimed primarily at 
improving access to quality care within State-funded facilities. 
Both are guidelines and act as a support base towards planning 
public services. By adhering to the Batho Pele principle 
of ‘people first’, the PHCP specifically encourages public 
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participation in the design of local health care services, as well 
as accountability on the part of the managers responsible for 
those services.  It is a flexible package, provides no legal basis 
for entitlement by patients and guides allocation of a fixed 
budget with an emphasis on improving access to care for 
common diseases. 
This contrasts with the PMBs which define the minimum 
level of care that has to be funded by all private medical 
insurers. They are aimed at increasing access to predominantly 
private services by promoting risk cross-subsidisation 
among medical scheme beneficiaries and by facilitating the 
future roll-out of mandatory, income-related medical scheme 
contributions. They are regulated, rigid and define a legal 
entitlement to care.  Any change to their ambit directly impacts 
budget allocation, as well as the total budget. They are the 
proposed basis for an eventual social health insurance package 
(SHIP (personal acronym)), also referred to as the basic benefit 
package (BBP) by the Ministerial Task Team on Social Health 
Insurance.
From PMBs to the BBP
Historic overview of the PMBs
To assess the feasibility of using PMBs as the platform for 
social health insurance (or indeed as the benchmark for 
the development of other core packages), a review of their 
development is necessary.  Originally they were collated by 
Soederlund and Peprah8 with the key objective of preventing 
free use of public services by those who could afford to 
pre-fund their medical care, thus protecting public hospitals 
from having to fulfil the role of ‘minimum insurer’. Such an 
approach was aligned with the Department of Health’s social 
health insurance strategy applicable at the time.9 To this end 
hospital-based care was ranked within proposed budgetary 
constraints to include first and foremost care that was regarded 
as non-discretionary (or urgent).  Cost-effectiveness of care 
was considered as a secondary factor.  Resulting from this was 
a proposal for a list of diagnosis-treatment pairs (DTPs) that 
included most emergency care, as well as hospital-based care 
for life-threatening conditions, some urgent care of non-life-
threatening conditions, maternity care and palliative care for 
the terminally ill.  Specifically excluded from the recommended 
package were very high-cost or ineffective treatments, and 
those for non-urgent, non-life-threatening conditions (e.g. 
cataract surgery, elective arthroplasty), as well as primary care 
services and out-of-hospital medicines relating to the DTPs.
Regulations and subsequent amendments in terms 
of the Medical Schemes Act (Act No. 131 of 1998) in 
chronological order
20 October 199910
The original PMB recommendations were eventually legislated 
in terms of 271 DTPs which were defined in broad diagnostic 
and therapeutic categories (e.g. epilepsy – status epilepticus, 
initial diagnosis, candidate for neurosurgery: medical 
management, ventilation, neurosurgery).  However, there 
were some noteworthy, yet unexplained, differences between 
the seminal work and the final regulations.  Despite broad 
adaptation of the principle that minimum care was limited to 
urgent, cost-effective hospital-based care in public facilities, 
some isolated highly discretionary services, as well as primary 
care interventions, had been added to the minimum benefits 
package (e.g. screening for breast cancer and cervical cancer, 
hormone replacement therapy, and infertility treatment). Of 
note is also that the key objectives of the PMBs were expanded 
to encourage improved efficiency in the allocation of private 
and public health care resources, and to protect medical scheme 
members against loss of insurance cover during time of greatest 
need.  
4 November 200211
Other than limited expansion of some primary care services 
relating to HIV infection and the inclusion of all emergency 
services, the most relevant early development of the PMBs 
was the apparent de-linking of the 271 DTPs from the concept 
of a hospital-based package, thus including primary care 
services for these diagnoses as well.  It is postulated that such 
a shift resulted from the concern that limitation of the PMBs 
to hospital-based care would exacerbate inefficiencies in the 
allocation of private resources as members seek specialised care 
that could equally be delivered in a primary care setting.  The 
expansion of PMBs to include delivery of services in the private 
sector where these are not reasonably accessible in the public 
sector is also noteworthy.
6 October 200312
In line with government’s updated strategy on the 
implementation of social health reform, PMBs were expanded 
further to include the care of chronic conditions.  Such reform 
was aimed at removing residual risk selection by schemes 
and increasing medical scheme coverage.13 To this end, 
therapeutic algorithms for 25 chronic diseases previously 
identified (also referred to as the Chronic Disease List or CDL) 
were published. Diagnosis descriptions for these particular 
conditions were based on the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD-10) coding, and treatment was described as a 
stepwise approach to pharmacological management.  The 
rationale for propagating a disease-based approach (as for 
example opposed to a drug-based approach) with regard to the 
management of chronic conditions is unknown.  Furthermore, 
although prevalence, disease burden, cost efficiency and disease 
severity were mentioned as criteria that contributed to disease 
selection, the rationale for selection of one disease over another 
remains obscure.  It is also unclear why the standard of care 
reflected within therapeutic algorithms was not consistently 
benchmarked against public sector practices, but instead 
included treatments not readily available at State facilities (e.g. 
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angiotensin-2-receptor blockers for hypertension, and more 
liberal use of statin therapy).
3 December 200414
Following the public sector’s commitment to the roll-out of 
antiretroviral therapy for the management of HIV infection, 
such care as outlined in national treatment guidelines was 
added to the PMB package.
11 February 200515
Despite poor efficacy and high cost of treatment, as well as non-
availability in the State sector, beta-interferon was added to the 
therapeutic algorithm for multiple sclerosis for patients with 
frequently relapsing and progressive disease.  The rationale for 
such a decision is not publicly available.
In summary, the current package is disease-based with an 
emphasis on the diagnosis and treatment of conditions whose 
severity may necessitate hospitalisation and where treatment is 
regarded as non-discretionary.  There are also some 26 chronic 
conditions requiring comprehensive cover for care; however 
the reason for inclusion of such diseases is not explicit and the 
standard of care is not benchmarked consistently against what 
is reasonably available in the State.  Furthermore, there are 
some ad hoc services that cannot be explained readily.  
From the original package that was confined to delivery of 
hospital-based care in public hospitals, the current package has 
been expanded to make substantial provision for associated and 
additional ambulatory and primary care, as well as for service 
delivery in private facilities (where individual members cannot 
reasonably access such care in State facilities). These changes 
are likely to reflect the changing goalposts of health care 
reform, evolving objectives of the PMBs, different interpretation 
and prioritisation of such objectives, as well as efforts by the 
regulator to counter negative responses by the industry to 
PMBs. 
Proposed future of PMBs
Further expansion of PMBs is now in the offing. The report 
to the South African Risk Equalisation Fund Task Group by 
the International Review Panel recommends inclusion of ‘all 
care that is usually delivered by primary care physicians’.16 
Reasons cited for such expansion include inter alia that primary 
care plays a pivotal role in the realisation of efficiency gains 
within a framework of social health insurance, and that the 
current package is not marketable as a stand-alone product.  
Such expanded PMBs are commonly referred to as the basic 
benefit package by policymakers and refer to the social health 
insurance package (SHIP) to which all persons earning above a 
certain threshold will be mandated to contribute on an income-
related basis.
Another parallel de facto expansion of PMBs that has been 
proposed by the regulator involves the so-called ‘common 
benefits’ for individual medical schemes.17 The minimum level 
of care for individual medical schemes as per Circular 817 is an 
attempt by the Council for Medical Schemes to broaden risk 
cross-subsidisation within individual medical schemes, and 
thus ensure that there is no risk-selection activity in respect of 
essential health care.  Such a minimum package is proposed to 
include PMBs plus all benefits common to all members of the 
particular scheme, which must include all hospital care covered 
by that scheme. This contrasts with the recommendation by the 
International Review panel where expansion would affect all 
schemes and where in the event of a risk-equalisation fund risk 
cross-subsidisation could be expanded across the industry.
Against such a background, a basic package (BP) has also 
been proposed by the draft Health Charter.  It is argued that 
such a core package is necessary to facilitate equity in health 
care which refers to equal access to equal care for equal need.  
The care so identified should reflect the ‘health safety net for 
all’.  Although more recent versions of the Health Charter 
differentiate this package from the PMBs (drafts on file), the 
BP must by definition be a subset of the PMBs if the former is 
interpreted as entitlement to predefined health care services 
funded by a third party.  However, given South Africa’s 
heterogeneous health care delivery system, fragmented funding 
thereof, as well as the country’s highly diverse population, 
the value and feasibility of a single care-based package is 
questioned.  Reasons for such a stance include the following:
1. The concept of a rigid health safety net for all undermines 
the principle that every citizen has the right to participate in 
the development of health policies18 and as such undermines 
the existing PHCP which encourages engagement of the 
population in the design of local health care services.  As funds 
are increasingly channelled towards mandated services, non-
mandated services are likely to be neglected.
2. It has already been identified that essential health care 
packages are aimed at facilitating particular aspects of health 
care reform. Given the different priorities identified for reform 
of the public and private delivery systems, it is unrealistic to 
expect a single package to achieve highly contrasting objectives.
3. As the definition of essential care is also an exercise in 
the prioritisation of limited funds, there must be a system of 
transparent budgeting.  Although a central equity fund to pay 
for essential services has been proposed as part of a national 
health insurance system, this is not only a very long-term goal, 
but the feasibility thereof has been questioned.16
4. Given that prioritisation is influenced by the cost-efficiency 
of health care services, the proposed variability of both costs 
and outcomes between different delivery systems and locations 
is problematic.  Not only do acquisition prices of services differ 
(e.g. the State purchases medicines at State tender prices), but 
outcomes depend on local infrastructure and expertise.
The social health insurance package 
(SHIP)
Having argued against a single basic package for the 
country, the question then remains whether the PMBs are the 
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appropriate foundation for social health reform.  For various 
reasons, it is proposed that they are in fact unsuitable.  From 
perspectives of prioritising care in a just manner, there are 
perceived problems relating to the decision-making process 
to date. From perspectives of engineering health system and 
financing reform, there is a concern that the PMBs are failing in 
their key objective of promoting efficiencies in the allocation of 
private resources, plus they have been identified as being too 
expensive to promote medical scheme growth.
Fair allocation of scarce resources
Accountability for reasonableness (A4R) 
As suggested previously, there are unfortunately no simple 
technical solutions that decide how best to allocate scarce 
resources in an equitable manner.  Instead, such decisions 
are rooted in diverse (and often conflicting) values and 
value systems that range from scientific and economic to 
social and moral ones.  For this reason it has been suggested 
that the process whereby decisions are taken is of critical 
importance.  In this regard a conceptual framework, also 
known as ‘accountability for reasonableness’ or A4R, has been 
developed.19 According to this model, a process that underpins 
fair decision-making must inter alia adhere to the following two 
criteria: (i) relevance – rationales for priority-setting decisions 
must be based on principles that ‘fair-minded’ people can agree 
to be relevant in the context; and (ii) publicity – priority-setting 
decisions and their rationales must be publicly accessible.
Although the original definition of PMBs followed such a 
process, their subsequent development did not abide by such 
principles.  
Undue abandonment 
Non-inclusion of care within an explicitly defined regulated 
minimum package predisposes to such care becoming 
increasingly inaccessible.  This is supported by the observation 
that in an attempt to keep medical scheme contributions 
affordable and competitive, private funds are discriminating 
against those with non-statutory diseases in their benefit 
design.  With the introduction of the CDL, 29.1% of open 
medical scheme options stopped providing chronic medication 
cover for patients with non-statutory diseases.20 In essence this 
means that patients with such conditions must either self-fund 
chronic care for these diseases or pre-fund it by joining more 
comprehensive, and therefore expensive, medical scheme 
options.  Only few patients can afford either and hence many 
are excluded altogether from receiving necessary ambulatory 
care for non-statutory chronic conditions. They are thus 
discriminated against simply on the basis of their underlying 
disease.
Although it may be argued that a minimum package will 
always be discriminatory, i.e. someone who needs care will 
lose out, exclusion of care should not be done haphazardly. 
For example, how can it be justified that in a system of social 
health insurance an individual with a debilitating arthritide 
other than rheumatoid arthritis should be mandated to pre-
fund health care on an income-related basis, yet purchase no 
care whatsoever for a disease that they have acquired by mere 
chance?  To the contrary it could be argued that if this was 
instead a lifestyle-propagated disease such as hyperlipidaemia, 
a severe restriction on mandatory funding of related care 
may be justified more readily (assuming that treatment does 
not achieve an overall cost-saving to the health care system). 
By not funding pharmacotherapy as per practice guidelines, 
individuals would still have the choice of intense lifestyle 
modification.  Furthermore, many patients would suffer no 
negative consequences from non-treatment, while others would 
continue to suffer future vascular events even if they had access 
to pharmacological interventions, i.e. the beneficiaries of active 
treatment would always remain incognito.
Health system management, reform and financing 
Efficiency of service delivery
There is also no convincing evidence to date that PMBs have 
achieved meaningful efficiencies in the allocation of private 
resources.  Despite there having been some increased use of 
formularies and protocols to promote more cost-effective use of 
medicines,20 hospital, specialist and administration costs have 
continued to increase.21 There are theoretical reasons to believe 
that PMBs could be positive contributors, and before further 
reform it is important to establish a better understanding of 
their potential role in this regard.
Affordability
Furthermore, the recent enquiry to identify barriers to the 
expansion of medical schemes concluded that the PMBs in their 
current format are too expensive and for this reason it has been 
suggested that an alternative set of minimum benefits should 
be considered for low-income medical schemes (LIMS).22 It is 
noteworthy that the benefits proposed in this regard have been 
specified in terms of services rather than diseases as occurred 
with the current minimum package.
Although the intentions of the PMBs have always been good, 
their subsequent development has resulted in a package that 
is deemed to be inequitable and as such contrary to the key 
objective of social health reform which is aimed at enhancing 
fairness in benefiting from health services.  Furthermore, it has 
been recognised that PMBs are too expensive for meaningful 
expansion of medical scheme membership. For this reason an 
alternative core package has been proposed for the low-income 
market (LIMS).  However, given that the latter is at the heart 
of social health reform, it is argued that the eventual benefits 
of LIMS would more aptly be regarded as the SHIP going 
forward.  If accepted, the ongoing purpose of PMBs necessitates 
clarification as they would no longer provide the platform on 
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which income cross-subsidisation in support of low-income 
earners could occur. Before introducing further PMB-based risk 
cross-subsidisation in the industry (e.g. risk-equalisation fund, 
PMB expansion, benefit design changes as per Circular 8), these 
issues should be addressed. 
Conclusion
Core packages are at the crux of health reform in South Africa.  
Strategically, they have two key functions.  The one is to 
prioritise health care services within budgetary constraints 
in order to ensure that available resources are allocated most 
judiciously.  The other is to prioritise health care services in 
order to effect a particular aspect of health care reform that 
is ultimately aimed at building a more equitable health care 
system.  Although the notion of a basic set of health care 
benefits for all is appealing, the single core package approach 
is by no means the panacea for achieving equity in health care 
financing and access.  For some interventions there is likely 
to be agreement that everyone should have access to these, 
irrespective of their ability to pay (e.g. simple analgesia for 
acute pain or palliation, assistance during childbirth), yet the 
scope of services decided by such consensus is likely to be 
very limited. From the perspective of guiding reform of the 
health care delivery system, the goals of change between the 
private and public delivery systems are simply too different 
to be accommodated under one umbrella.  Furthermore, the 
extent to which government and medical administrators can 
prioritise care fairly and efficiently via the explicit definition 
of benefits is limited.  In many instances such prioritisation 
is best performed by practitioners.  However, the current 
structure of the health care delivery system and its legislative 
framework, including PMBs, is not conducive to bedside 
rationing where care is funded through medical schemes.  It is 
argued that particularly for specialised services, a ‘queueing’ 
system would lead to significantly fairer and better health 
outcomes than an all-or-nothing funding approach. A queueing 
system in this instance refers to a mechanism whereby treating 
practitioners have a direct responsibility for allocating limited 
resources judiciously (e.g. by means of accountability for a fixed 
budget or a fixed number of beds).  Above all, core packages 
cannot be developed and implemented within a budgetary 
vacuum (given that they are a product of resource limitations).  
Particularly where minimum benefits are mandated in legal 
terms, there must be consideration of their potential financial 
impact and the implications thereof.  For example, as the scope 
and level of care of PMBs is increased, the funding of non-
statutory services is likely to decrease even further and medical 
scheme membership may be impacted negatively as the cost 
of the core package escalates (unless of course significant 
efficiencies are achieved in the delivery of legislated care or the 
core package is subsidised in a meaningful manner, neither of 
which is envisaged in the South African context in the short 
to medium term). Or, as PMB-based risk cross-subsidisation is 
further enforced through scheme-specific common benefits and 
the REF, young and healthy members may increasingly opt out 
of medical schemes, unless membership is compulsory.  
At this point in time the core package approach in South 
Africa is a quagmire on which no equitable or sustainable 
health care system can be built. To be successful, different 
initiatives must be clearly delineated, their objectives defined 
and prioritised, their contents developed in a fair manner and 
their impact monitored.  Most of all, there must be a common 
(and realistic) vision for health care financing and delivery in 
South Africa.  Blinkered pursuit of solidarity through forced 
risk cross-subsidisation may result in more harm than good, 
unless synchronised with financing reform – for this there must 
be engagement of organised labour, business representatives, 
and those in government who hold the purse strings.  
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